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VALUE 
Value generally refers to the amount of 
money or other goods that must be paid to 
obtain sonlething. There arc nonetheless a 
number of very different value concepts, 
and ill particular there is considerable dif-
ference between the ways in which eco-
nomic socioloS'Y and orthodox economics 
treat the concept of value. In contrast, 
between l'conOlllic sociology and hetero-
dox economics there arc significant com-
monalities regarding the treatment of the 
concept of value. The differences date back 
to the origins of sociology and classical 
econonlics, and persist or have perhaps 
become sharper between contemporary eco-
nomic sociology and neoclassical econom-
ics. The commonalities between economic 
socioloS'Y and heterodox economics have 
emerged particularly since the 1 ~m()s. 
III the history of sociology, value has 
been treated as a property of entire social 
systems, such as when it is associated with 
the concept of culture by Max '\leber, one 
of the early founders of sociology: The 
concept of culture is a value concept. 
Empirical reality becomes 'culture' to us 
because and inso['lr as we rebte it to value 
ideas (Weber 1949: 7(l). 
On this view, our interest in reality is a 
function of the values which culture 
embodies, that is, our interest in the world 
is a 'value-conditioned' one. Sometimes 
termed the 'values approach to culture', it 
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has been argued that such an approach 
treats culture monolithically as singularly 
shaping 'action by supplying ultimate ends 
or values towards which action is directed' 
(Swidler 19S(l: 273). This perspective is to 
be compared with the concept of value in 
classical economics of Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo, where the concept con-
cerns a set of relationships that obtain 
within a system in the form of commodity 
prices or exchange values. As Smith puts it: 
'The value of any commodity ... is equal 
to the quantity of labour which it enables 
him to purchase or command. Labour ... is 
the real meaSUIT of the exchangeable value 
of all commodities' (Smith 197(l: 47). 
Here, value is not an ultimate end towards 
which action is directed, but rather the 
effect of action involved in the work 
required to extract objects of consumption 
from nature. 
Emile Durkheim criticized Smith's clas-
sical value theory explanation in terms of 
labour input by arguing that it missed the 
central dimension of the concept of value. 
Value understood in terms of labour con-
tent appears as if it were something entirely 
objective and impersonal. But Durkheim 
argued that such a conception overlooks 
the role of social opinion in determining 
value, particularly in determining notions 
of just value (Durkheim 1992). This same 
critique, it should be noted, can be exten-
ded to neoclassical value theory in that it 
also treats value as market price, though 
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rather as determined by objective and 
impersonal f(lrCeS of supply and demand. 
])urkheim's argument was framed primarily 
in terms of the v:tlue of labour, and while it 
might be applied to the value of cOllSumer 
and other types of goods, he focused on 
arguing that the wage rate depends upon 
social standards regarding the minimum 
resources needed to sustain to survival, that 
these standards were set by public opinion, 
and that they changed from period to per-
iod. However, Smith, David Ric:trdo and 
even more strongly Karl Marx each held in 
v:trying degrees similar views regarding the 
social determination of the wage. And since 
for each of them the value of other com-
modities depended upon the value of 
labour, this implies that their values also 
possessed a social component. 
Durkheim's critique, however, is more 
successful in regard to the neoclassical view 
of the wage :ts determined by the marginal 
productivity of labour in production and in 
regard to the neoclassical view of price in 
general as market-determined. The mar-
ginal productivity of labour is a schedule of 
outputs made possible by incremental 
increases in labour input. Its level reflects 
the quantity of capital employed by labour, 
where both labour input and the capital 
employed are desCl;bed in natural units: 
hours of labour and a certain quantity of 
machines and equipment. While one might 
say that social standards and public opinion 
implicitly underlie these values, rarely do 
these considerations enter into standard 
analysis. Much the same can be s:tid about 
the explanation of price in general in neo-
classical economics. Consumers play an 
important role in determining market price, 
but consumer preferences are taken as 
given and unchanging (Stigler and Uecker 
1977), so that their social determinants may 
be disregarded. Even more strongly, 
revealed preference price theory (Samuel-
son 194H), which most mainstream econo-
mists now take as the standard explanation 
of choice, makes the very content of pre-
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ferences irrdev;\IJ( to consulller choice. 
More generally. the fi.lrI11alist character of 
nlllch recent l'cononlln reinf()rces the 
notion that value as price lacks any social 
characteristics whatsoever. 
In contrast, heterodox traditions in eco-
nomics, particularly AlIlericlI] institutional 
econonllcs and soci:11 economics, hold 
views of value rellliniscent of Weber's view 
that value is a property of entire social sys-
tellls and I )urkheim's conception of market 
values as socially influenced. American 
institutional economists Thorstein Veblen, 
John C01l1mons, John Maurice Clark and 
others 1l1:1ke central institutiollS seen as 
'settled habits of thought common to the 
generality of 1l1en' (Veblen 1919: 239). 
Social economics, with origins in Simonde 
de Sis1l1ondi, Karl Marx, Leon Wah'as, 
Joseph Schum peter, John Hobson and 
John Maurice Clark, see the social econ-
omy :1S encompassing the market economy, 
so that social values and worldviews 
penlle:tte m:trkets and underlie consump-
tion, production and distribution. Other 
heterodox approaches, such as Marxist 
economics, feminist economics, some eco-
logical economics approaches :tnd post-
Keynesian economics, :tIT similarly holistic, 
historically oriented, critical of the n:tt-
ur:tIism and positivislll in economics, :tnd 
reject the atomistic individualism of neo-
classical economics. The last is a key point 
of tangency between heterodox economics 
:tnd economic sociology and :t key differ-
ence between orthodox economics and 
economic sociology. Just as Georg Simmel, 
in his il1lportant early study The Philosophy 
(!f MOlle), (197H), identified related types of 
individuals (such as the spendthrift and the 
miser) according to their linked positions in 
:tn economic system governed by money, 
radical and Marxist economists see indivi-
duals :ts socially connected through their 
membership in cbsses :tnd social groups 
that inter:tct within systel1ls of power, while 
feminist economists see gender relation-
ships in the economy as constitutive of 
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individll;lls' economic roles and economic 
prospects. 
Interestingly, economic sociology enjoyed 
a revival in thc 1 ')ROs, a period in which 
hcterodox CCOllOlllics was also undergoing 
considerable developmcnt. While croSSOVl'r 
relationships betwecn the two have been 
limitcd, thcy havc noncthcless appear to 
have each f()llowed certain parallel path-
ways tlLlt lIIay bc scen to derive from a 
sharcd critiquc of the assumptions of nco-
classical economics. Even lIIore intl'rest-
ingly, cconomic sociology and heterodox 
economics appear to share broad outlines of 
a view of individuals ;IS socially embcdded 
a III Karl Polanyi, and of individuals and 
society as mutually influencing. Thus, 
p;lrallel to economic sociologist Mark 
Granovctter's influcntial characterization 
of individuals' embedded ness in terms of 
being ncithcr undersocialized nor over-
socialized (Granovetter 19R5), there is cri-
tical rcalism, a rccent heterodox rcsearch 
programlllc cOlllbining a number of differ-
ent hcterodox approachcs, that employs a 
structure-agent conception of society in 
which individuals both influence and are 
influenccd by social structurcs (Lawson 
1997), and also a renewed interest in the 
evolutiolJ:lry thcllles of Veblenian institu-
tional economics, that clllphasizes upward 
and downward causation operating between 
individuals and institutions (Hodgson 20(4). 
The 19f1Os also signal the beginnings of 
changc in mainstream economics, with the 
emergence of a collection of new research 
programmcs that bear limited rescmblance 
to neoclassical economics and each other. 
These new research progr:lIlll11es have 
almost all originated outside economics, 
thus not only importing modes of thinking 
often quite [lr removed from the traditional 
assumptions of neoclassical economics, but 
also reversing a peliod of economic 
imperialism when the individual rationality 
assumptions of neoclassical economics were 
re-applied outside of economics. Gamc 
theory comes from mathematics, and chal-
VALUE 
lenges the notion that economic individuals 
are isolated from one another by exalllining 
their interaction in games. In placc of 
value as market pricc, value in gamc the-
ory is understood in tcrms of sets of alter-
native payoff~ which dcpend upon how 
players anticipate cach other's choices. Non-
cooperative, one-shot games bcar lIIany of 
the features of the ncoclassical economic 
view of the individual, but repcated games 
and cooperative gamcs introducc a variety 
of consideratiollS rcgarding play that make 
social structure central. Another new 
rescarch programmc, behavioural econom-
ics, with origillS in psychology, has filCused 
on re-examination of neoclassical rational 
choice thcory. Among its results, demon-
strated repeatedly in expcrimental studies, is 
that economic individuals oftcn cooperate 
rather than behavc in a self-interested 
manner. Additionally, individuals' deci-
sion-making appears to reflcct heuristic 
cognitive bias (lISe of rules of thumb rather 
than rigorous analysis) ;lIId diffcrcnt kinds 
of dccision-fi-aming cflects associated with 
habits, 'herd mentality' and emotional 
attachments. For example, valuation can bc 
influenced by strong feelings of regret 
individuals have regarding the loss of spe-
cially prized goods. Yet a third ncw research 
programme, evolutionary economics, 
including evolutionalY game theory, with 
origins in Darwinian biology, has multiple 
currents, some overlapping with game the-
ory and behavioural economics. Here, 
investigation first focused on evolutionary 
change in economic systcms, and value is 
modelled as the frequcncy-dcpendent fIt-
ness of different survival strategics ill popu-
lations over time. Subsequent investigation 
replaces this biological emphasis with the 
idea of cultural evolution of bcliefs and 
norms, and value is modelled in terms of 
the 'fitness' of these belief~ and norms to 
promote some generally useful good. Thcsc 
new research programmes in maillStream 
economics mayor may not converge on 
the value thcmes that have characterizcd 
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VALUES 
economic sociology (and heterodox eco-
nomics) in the future. While some Cllrrents 
in recent economics give prominence to 
social value concepts, others appear to be 
guided more by natural science and form-
alist ideas. On the whole, however, recent 
economics is a f.lr more eclectic theoretical 
undertaking than neoclassical economics, 
particularly as reflected in the former's 
departures from the latter's linked postu-
lates of value ullderstood as market price 
and individuals understood as isolated 
beings. Thus, whereas there remain clear 
differences between economic sociology and 
neoclassical economics regarding the con-
cept of value, whether these differences will 
persist between the former and economics 
as it emerges in the future remain to be seen. 
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VEBLEN, THORSTEIN 
Thorstein Veblen (1 H57-1 ()2<J) was a het-
erodox American economist who laid the 
intellectual foundations of American insti-
tutional economics. The son of Norwegian 
immigrants, Veblen studied at Carleton 
College, John Hopkins University, Yale 
University (where he received a PhD in 
philosophy) and Corlll'll University (where 
he did graduate work in economics). In the 
course of a cheCluered academic career, he 
held teaching positions at the University 
of Chicago (I H<J2-1 <J()(l) , Stanford Uni-
versity (I <)()(l-<J), the University of Missouri 
(1<J11-1H) and the New School for Social 
R.escarch (1 (J1 H-2(,). Closely attuned to intel-
lectual developmcnts in a broad range of 
academic disciplines and national contexts, 
Veblen inCOlVOr:ltcd into his economic 
writings concepts and theorics from con-
temporary rcscarch in psychology, cthnol-
ogy and the biological sciences, as part of a 
determined cffort to bring economics in 
stcp with the widely respected evolutionary 
sciences of his cra. 
Entcring economics when the field was 
embroiled in controversies betwcen so-
called orthodox approaches and challenges 
fi'o11l traditions such as the German histor-
ical school, Veblen sharpened and elabo-
rated the critique of orthodox classical and 
ncoclassical economic theory. At the same 
time, he upbraided exponents of the his-
torical school for 'content[ing[ themselves 
with an enullleration of data [and tliling[ to 
curre t
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